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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
    dentifying a framework for assessing the permissible geography of armed 
conflict must be driven by both strategic and legal considerations. Armed 
conflict by its very nature manifests the exercise of national power impli-
cating the most fundamental aspect of sovereignty: the right and obligation 
of the State to protect itself from internal or external threat.1 Categories of 
armed conflict2 and their associated legal regimes evolved in response to 
this reality. Up until recently, almost all threats functionally sufficient in 
nature and magnitude to necessitate a full–blown military response (the use 
of military force to execute combat operations, as opposed to constabulary 
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brought to his duties as a platoon leader and a battalion effects coordinator in Iraq, and as 
co–captain of Army football. The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, 
the Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense. © 2013 by Geoffrey S. Corn. 
1. Deni Elliott, Terrorism, Global Journalism and the Myth of the Nation-State, 19 JOURNAL 
OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS: EXPLORING QUESTIONS OF MEDIA MORALITY 29 (2004). 
2. Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conven-
tions and Protocols, 63 THE HAGUE ACADEMY COLLECTED COURSES 131 (1979). 
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support operations)3 took the form of hostilities between two or more 
States (characterized by international law as international armed conflicts), 
and bringing into force the full corpus of the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC), or internal dissident or insurgent threats involving hostilities be-
tween State forces and organized armed groups (characterized by interna-
tional law as non–international armed conflicts, and bringing into force a 
less comprehensive albeit substantial body of LOAC regulation). Accord-
ingly, LOAC responded to these two “types” of armed conflicts4 with a 
continual and important progression of regulatory norms applicable to 
both categories.5 These norms, and the constant progression of their con-
tent and applicability, were and are intended to balance the strategic needs 
of the State with the humanitarian objectives that have always animated 
conflict regulation.6 
It is debatable, however, whether these two categories of armed con-
flict were from inception underinclusive, in the sense that they failed to 
account for situations of armed hostilities falling outside their scope.7 This 
underinclusiveness is illustrated by U.S. military history. Examples of com-
bat operations that would fail to fit nicely within these two dominant cate-
gories of armed conflict include the U.S. participation in the multinational 
response to the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China; the 1916 U.S. punitive raid 
against Pancho Villa in Mexico; and the U.S. and Allied intervention in the 
Russian Civil War (which actually resulted in a U.S. force presence on Rus-
sian soil through 1921, long after the end of World War I).8 These exam-
                                                                                                                      
3. See Keith Robert Lovejoy, A Peacekeeping Force for Future Operations: Another Reassess-
ment of the Constabulary Force Concept (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr 
/fulltext/u2/a414134.pdf. 
4. Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Con-
cepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1, 82–86 (2009) 
(discussing the different types of armed conflict) [hereinafter Vité]. 
5. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, ICRC, CUSTOMARY IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2012). 
6. ICRC, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: BASIC KNOWLEDGE, 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law1_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 
2012) and Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 125 (1997). 
7. Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recog-
nize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 295, 296–97 (2007) [hereinafter Corn]. 
8. Michael Parenti, Rulers of the Planet: Why US Leaders Intervene Everywhere, 5 GLOBAL 
DIALOGUE (2003), available at http://www.worlddialogue.org/print.php?id=220. 
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ples illustrate that in practice armed conflict has never been statically con-
fined to the two “types” that became the dominant focus of conflict regula-
tion following World War II. More important for the purposes of this es-
say, these two categories of armed conflict have not been the definitive 
standard for assessing the geographic scope of combat operations.9 
The post–World–War–II bipolar strategic environment did, however, 
reinforce the binary nature of armed conflict typology—and with it the as-
sumption that the nature of the armed conflict included an implicit geo-
graphic scope limitation. Wars were generally confined to the geography of 
one or two States. Even the limited inter–State armed conflicts of the peri-
od lacked the widespread geographic range of operations that defined the 
two world wars.10 Instead, as a result of the immense perceived risks asso-
ciated with conflagration, most armed conflicts were generally “self–
contained” events. Nonetheless, the perceived U.S. need for global en-
gagement capability was a primary characteristic of national security policy. 
The Cold War was indeed defined by the strategic capacity to meet any 
threat, in any location, in the form in which it presented itself.11 While his-
tory was kind to spare the world from the global consequence of the Cold 
War turning hot, the practice of forward deployment and global engage-
ment indicates that had this occurred, the conflict would have been world-
wide. 
The end of the Cold War blew the lid off of a pot that had been sim-
mering for the entire period: the threat of international terrorism. While 
during the Cold War terrorism was generally treated as a subtext to the 
global bipolar struggle,12 it soon came into its own as a national security 
threat. While the risk associated with international terrorism became in-
creasingly apparent, the modality for protecting against this risk was any-
thing but apparent. During the decade preceding September 11, 2001, this 
situation manifested itself in tremendous operational uncertainty, especially 
for the armed forces. Counterterrorism was viewed as one of the many po-
tential military missions that fell into the category of “Low Intensity Con-
                                                                                                                      
9. Department of the Navy, MCDP 1, WARFIGHTING (1997). 
10. See generally MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY 
(1994); RONALD STORY, CONCISE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF WORLD WAR II: THE GEOGRA-
PHY OF ARMED CONFLICT (2005). 
11. See ROGER S. WHITCOMB, THE COLD WAR IN RETROSPECT: THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS 182–84 (1998). 
12. WAYNE C. MCWILLIAMS & HARRY PIOTROWSKI, THE WORLD SINCE 1945: A 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1 (6th ed. 2005). 
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flict” or “Military Operations Other Than War.”13 U.S. military doctrine did 
not, however, address the legal characterization of such missions. Conse-
quently, military counterterrorism was generally understood as military 
support to international law enforcement,14 although military action occa-
sionally took the form of combat operations (such as the cruise missile at-
tack against suspected al Qaeda targets in response to the African embassy 
bombings).15 Whatever the legal characterization, one thing seemed increas-
ingly clear: the scope of operations would, like virtually all other military 
missions, be threat driven. 
How the U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 
impacted the typology of armed conflict is arguably yesterday’s news, at 
least for the United States. While certainly not an accepted theory of armed 
conflict, the term “transnational armed conflict” (TAC)—indicating a non–
international armed conflict, and its accordant LOAC rules, occurring out-
side the territory of the responding State—has gained increasing traction in 
the United States and abroad to denote an armed conflict against a non–
State threat in various global environments.16 This usage suggests a broader 
recognition of the under–inclusiveness of the binary armed conflict frame-
work. There is also no question that assertion of a hybrid category of 
armed conflict—whether characterized as TAC or an internationalized 
Common Article 3 armed conflict—has generated substantial consterna-
tion that is in large measure the result of the link between TAC and the 
broad geographic scope of military operations it ostensibly legitimizes.17 
                                                                                                                      
13. See James N. Miller Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / 
Low-Intensity Conflict, available at http://policy.defense.gov (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).  
14. Joint Publication 3-26, COUNTERTERRORISM, (2009), available at http://www.dtic. 
mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm. 
15. LAUREN PLOCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COUNTERING TERROR-
ISM IN EAST AFRICA: THE U.S. RESPONSE 1–2 (2010). 
16.  Vité, supra note 4, at 88; Corn, supra note 7; see Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric T. Jen-
sen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A "Principled" Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror 
Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 1, 33–34 (2009) (discussing how the continued 
evolution of TAC, or the acts of “war” carried out by States that attack non-State targets 
outside of their boundaries, must preserve “the fundamental balance between authority 
and obligations that lies at the core of the LOAC” to preserve its legitimacy as it becomes 
more common) [hereinafter Corn & Jensen]. 
17. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Tar-
geting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone, 161 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2049532 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Daskal]; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Defining 
Armed Conflict, 13 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 393 (2008); George Monbiot, A 
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The debate over conflict typology raises this question: is the TAC con-
cept inherently invalid? Put another way, is the invocation of unrestricted 
geographic scope for an armed conflict against a non–State opponent the 
true focal point of objection to this typology? The latter proposition may 
explain why some experts now seek to impose an implied geographic limi-
tation on the conduct of operations within the framework of TAC—such 
as an implied constraint to what some scholars have labeled “hot zones” of 
military operations.18 Ultimately, however, seeking to identify and impose a 
geographic restriction detached from the threat dynamics triggering the use 
of combat power is a false solution to the concerns of operational over-
breadth associated with TAC. Such limitation is a futile endeavor, for the 
developing axiomatic reason that once a State commits to the use of force 
as a remedy against such a transnational non–State threat—like all other 
conflicts in history—the dynamics of the threat itself will be the predomi-
nant consideration in defining the scope of operations.  
This latter premise frustrates some international law scholars. They in-
sist that the first step in defining the geographic scope of military opera-
tions is to assess the internationally permissible geography of armed con-
flict. Strategy, they posit, must yield to international legal constraint.19  
This is undoubtedly the “correct” ideological starting point: law impos-
es its own geography—the geography of permissible policy maneuver 
space. Decisions related to when, where and how to use instruments of 
national power are not made in a legal vacuum. Rather, domestic and inter-
national law significantly impact these decisions. Legal advisors inform pol-
icy decisions by providing the policymaker with the left and right bounda-
ries of permissible conduct. This framework is far more complex on the 
more specific issue of geography of armed conflict. Even assuming interna-
tional law categorically constrains permissible strategy options (an assump-
tion that ignores the reality that States periodically choose to violate inter-
national law in order to achieve vital national security objectives), the rele-
vant law must be unequivocal. On the question of conflict geography, 
                                                                                                                      
Wilful Blindness, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk. 
/world/2003/mar/11/usa.iraq.  
18. Daskal, supra note 17; Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative 
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
483 (2012) [hereinafter Deeks]. 
19. Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 84 AIR 
FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 35–36 (2008). 
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however, this is not the case. It involves a complex intersection of jus ad 
bellum,20 neutrality21 and jus in bello principles.22 
None of these sources categorically define a geographic constraint on 
the execution of combat operations within the context of an ongoing non–
international armed conflict. Instead, they combine to provide a general 
outline of acceptable State action, sometimes by analogy (such as the effort 
to extend neutrality principles to the inapposite context of non–
international armed conflict), or sometimes more directly (such as the in-
vocation of the principle of military necessity as a source of authority to 
adopt a threat–based scope of combat operations). On the geography of 
conflict question, the net outcome is anything but an unequivocal interna-
tional legal standard that nullifies the validity of a ––driven scope of mili-
tary operations. This is unsurprising. The entire TAC concept is an evolu-
tion of existing LOAC principles, as is the exercise of national self–defense 
in response to a transnational non–State threat. Thus, international law has 
yet to settle on an issue as complex as permissible geography of operations 
conducted in response to the threat of international terrorism.  
Seeking to identify some legally mandated geographic boundary for 
armed conflict of any type is, thus, a genuine Red Herring.23 Armed conflict 
is a threat–driven concept, arising when the threat necessitates resort to 
combat power, and extending to wherever the operational and tactical op-
portunity to produce a militarily valuable effect on the enemy arises. There 
are examples of States choosing not to expand the scope of conflicts simp-
ly because such an opportunity arose. However, other factors impact such 
decisions, and it would be an error to equate decisions to refrain from ex-
ercising authority with an inherent legal prohibition against such exercise.  
The scope of TAC—like that of any armed conflict—must be threat 
driven for a reason. Admittedly, there exists a perceived and actual risk of 
                                                                                                                      
20. Deeks, supra note 18. 
21. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT NEUTRALITY, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law8 
_final.pdf (“Belligerent States have a number of duties. They must establish a neutrality 
policy ensuring respect for neutral space, in particular that armed forces involved in the 
conflict do not enter neutral space and that neutral States are not affected by the collateral 
effects of hostilities.”). 
22. Most notably the principle of military necessity as a justification for taking the 
fight to the enemy. 
23. Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications 
(Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights 
_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf. 
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an overzealous and overbroad assertion of LOAC–based authority to at-
tack and disable threat operatives inherent in the combined effect of TAC 
as a theory of armed conflict typology and a threat–driven scope interpreta-
tion. Nonetheless, States must avoid attempts to identify or impose some 
per se geographic limitations on this type of armed conflict. Any authority 
overreach (invoking the power to incapacitate through an application of 
LOAC principles), triggered by extending the concept of armed conflict to 
transnational non–State threats, will be more effectively mitigated by focus-
ing on the traditional dynamics of lawful wartime action and tailoring or 
adjusting traditional sources of LOAC authority to meet the unique chal-
lenges of this type of armed conflict. Chief among these particular chal-
lenges are, one, ensuring that the targeting process adequately accounts for 
the complexity of threat identification in this inherently unconventional 
environment; and two, ensuring that preventive detention processes suffi-
ciently address the unique scope and nature of this type of armed conflict. 
Focusing on these two practical challenges will produce a better balance 
between national security realities and the individual interests of potential 
objects of State action than would be achieved by attempting to confine 
that action to an arbitrary “hot zone.”  
 
II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE  
GLOBALIZATION OF NON–INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
 
It is self–evident that a principal function of any government is to protect 
State interests from external and internal threats.24 To do so, leaders lever-
age the various components of national power, ideally in a synchronized 
manner that maximizes strategic success by achieving the protective objec-
tive as efficiently as possible.25 Military power is a key tool in the national 
security arsenal, often providing strategic decision makers with unique ca-
pabilities to inflict devastating blows to disrupt or disable threat capabili-
ties. 
For the United States, the ability to leverage military power effectively 
is rooted in its very origins. A nation born of conflict, and unified in part 
                                                                                                                      
24. President Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 2009), 
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture 
_en.html. 
25. See President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States (Sept. 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss 
/2002/nss3.html [hereinafter National Security Strategy]. 
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because of the recognized need to “perfect” our collective ability to pro-
vide for a common defense, the use of military power to secure national 
security objectives has been a constant theme of our national narrative. In 
this sense, the utilization of military power to contribute to the national 
objective of neutralizing the capacity of international terrorism is not espe-
cially remarkable. Indeed, it seems more noteworthy that it took the devas-
tating attacks of September 11 for national leaders to become overt and 
unapologetic about this utilization, even though it is well established that 
such use was ongoing prior to that date.26 
No single national security policy shift in recent memory has produced 
more legal controversy than the overt, robust and ongoing use of a State’s 
military power as an international counterterrorism tool.27 This is equally 
unremarkable for two primary reasons. First, never before had the United 
States engaged in an ongoing military campaign of this magnitude and du-
ration against a non–State opponent operating in various locations 
throughout the globe. Second, and perhaps more importantly, is the con-
sistent invocation of authority derived from a situation of armed conflict to 
provide the legal foundation for these military operations. This has pro-
duced a profound expansion of national authority to seek out and incapaci-
tate members of terrorist organizations falling within the scope of what the 
United States considers the “enemy”—defined by the authority to kill as a 
measure of first resort and subject captives to long–term preventive deten-
tion.28 
When the Bush administration originally coined the phrase “Global 
War on Terror” (GWOT), it was intended to put the terrorist enemy on 
notice that no longer were they functionally immune from the powerful 
U.S. combat arsenal. However, it also unleashed a decade long barrage of 
                                                                                                                      
26. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks upon the United States (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911 
/hearings/hearing6/witness_schulhofer.htm.  
27. Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINNESO-
TA LAW REVIEW 1407, 1407–8 (2007); Monbiot, supra note 17. 
28. Corn & Jensen, supra note 16, at 45–46; John Brennan, Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Secu-
rity Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values (Sept. 
16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-
brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an [hereinafter Brennan Speech]; 
Eric H. Holder Jr., Department of Justice Attorney General, Northwestern University 
School of Law, Speech on Targeted Killing (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/ 
opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
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controversy, driven in large measure by the suggestion that this new “war” 
lacked any geographical limitation. Unlike wars of the recent past, all of 
which were conducted within a de facto geographically confined battlespace, 
the United States would, according to this new theory, take the fight to the 
enemy—an enemy so unconventional that this might include locations 
without even the slightest link to a theater of “active” combat operations, 
areas commonly characterized as “hot zones” today. Although President 
Obama abandoned the GWOT moniker, his administration nonetheless 
continues to strike targets of opportunity when and where they emerge, 
embracing the same threat–based scope of combat operations.29 
In practice, these operations have never come close to matching the ex-
treme rhetoric of power assertion invoked by opponents of the armed con-
flict with al Qaeda. The United States has never engaged in a cavalier asser-
tion of combat power into the territory of a functioning State.30 Opponents 
to the GWOT concept like to erect the straw man of a U.S. attack in the 
streets of Berlin, London, Paris or Zurich to demonstrate the consequences 
of a geographically unconstrained armed conflict against an unconventional 
terrorist enemy. In reality, however, the actual scope of combat operations 
has always been much more constrained by the (at least implicit) recogni-
tion of sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, the concept of armed conflict of international scope con-
ducted against a loosely organized non–State opponent—a typology of 
armed conflict resulting in the increasingly common characterization of 
“transnational armed conflict,”—certainly creates the perception, if not the 
reality, of authority overreach. The central theme of this theory is that the 
nature of the struggle justifies invoking and applying LOAC–based authori-
ties, while at the same time the dispersed and unconventional nature of the 
“enemy” necessitates taking the fight to where the attack opportunity aris-
es.  
It cannot, however, be disputed that TAC represents a major shift in 
the conventional understanding of armed conflict typology.31 Prior to Sep-
                                                                                                                      
29. Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 UNI-
VERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 675, 675–76 (2012) (“In 
2010, the United States launched 118 drone strikes in Pakistan, an exponential increase 
over past years. In a broader view, in 2009, the U.S. Army reported a 400% increase in 
drone flight hours over the previous ten years. Drones are regularly used in combat opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Libya, and have been used to launch targeted killings in Somalia 
and Yemen.”). 
30. Deeks, supra note 18. 
31. Vité, supra note 4. 
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tember 11, these conflicts were almost always confined geographically, 
rarely if ever raising the question of their legitimacy.32 When they spilled 
into the territory of neighboring States, no significant debate was ever gen-
erated over the legally permissible “zone” of operations. This is no longer 
the case. Instead, primarily as the result of U.S. military operations against 
al Qaeda, there is an increasing tendency to assert that even if it is possible 
for the United States to be engaged in an armed conflict against this terror-
ist enemy, that conflict must be confined to “hot zones” of combat, most 
notably Afghanistan.33 This assertion, however, fails to recognize the stra-
tegic imperative that drove the development of this TAC typology. It was 
precisely the need to take this fight to the unconventional enemy—
wherever the threat arose—that generated the assertion of an international-
ized non–international armed conflict.  
 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TERRORIST THREAT,  
TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT AND GEOGRAPHY OF WAR 
 
Prior to September 11 and the advent of TAC, there was virtually no dis-
course on the permissible geographic scope of armed conflict. This is un-
surprising, considering almost all armed conflicts of this period were inter-
nal, or relatively confined inter–State conflicts.34 Even when internal armed 
conflicts “spilled over” into neighboring territories, no State asserted the 
authority to conduct “global” operations against the non–State insurgent 
enemy. Use of the term “Global War on Terror” fundamentally altered the 
existing paradigm. Suddenly, a State was invoking the authority to engage 
what it determined were belligerent operatives wherever the opportunity to 
do so arose. U.S. global reach and dominant combat capability made it 
clear that this new enemy could not afford the risk of “basing” operations 
out of operational clusters confined to one geographic area. Because dis-
persion had to, by necessity, become the modus operandi of this new enemy,35 
                                                                                                                      
32. Id.; Corn, supra note 7. 
33. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Pre-emptive Self-Defense, ASIL Task Force on 
Terrorism (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf [hereinaf-
ter O’Connell]. 
34. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law: International Discourses, in CIVIL 
WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW 48–53 (Agnes Hurwitz & Reyko Huang eds., 2008). 
35. Manuel Almeida, What’s New in Al-Qaeda’s Suicide Bombings?, THE MAJALLA: THE 
LEADING ARAB MAGAZINE (Jun. 17, 2010), available at http://www.majalla.com/eng/ 
2010/06/article5567539. 
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it inherently drove operations to extend beyond the “hot zone” of Afghan-
istan.36 
Of course, it also fueled criticism of the armed conflict characteriza-
tion. Critics, relying on the “organization” and “intensity” test for assessing 
the existence of non–international armed conflict adopted in the Tadic ap-
peals judgment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia, insisted that TAC was a legal nullity.37 In contrast, the United 
States has adopted more of a totality–of–the–circumstances approach to 
assess the existence of armed conflict, relying on the intense risk presented 
by al Qaeda and that organization’s objective of inflicting harm on the 
United States and its interests wherever and whenever possible to offset 
the organization element of the Tadic test.38 Such an approach is justified 
when the effectiveness of operations against an opponent disables the abil-
ity of that opponent to manifest traditional organizational characteristics. 
Indeed, proponents of TAC (a typology of armed conflict frequently asso-
ciated with this author) implicitly understand that a strict two–prong test 
for assessing armed conflict produces a perverse windfall for the transna-
tional terrorist enemy: as their operations become more unconventional 
and dispersed, the authority of the State to press the attack dissipates. Re-
cent speeches by Obama administration officials seem to indicate that the 
assessed risk of future terrorist attacks is driving the decision to mount un-
relenting pressure on al Qaeda.39 Depriving the State of legal freedom of 
maneuver to press the advantage against a degraded non–State enemy is 
ultimately inconsistent with its strategic and operational imperative. At a 
minimum, it raises the complex issue of assessing the point at which a 
non–international armed conflict recedes back into a category of non–
conflict and nullifies LOAC applicability—an issue lacking clear and con-
sistent standards.40 
                                                                                                                      
36. President Barack Obama, supra note 24. 
37. Vité, supra note 4. 
38. Brennan Speech, supra note 28 (“This Administration’s counterterrorism efforts 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who are a threat to the 
United States, whose removal would cause a significant—even if only temporary—
disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”); see also 
Laurie Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law and the Imperatives 
of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW __ (forthcom-
ing, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029989. 
39. Brennan Speech, supra note 28. 
40. Vité, supra note 4 (discussing the lack of standards defining when a non-
international armed conflict recedes back into a category of non-conflict). 
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Where the United States presses this advantage has been and remains 
the other major source of consternation with the TAC concept. Critics as-
sert an inherent invalidity to a claim of armed conflict authority that ex-
ceeds the geographic bounds of a “hot zone” of operations.41 While tactical 
spillover operations into contiguous States may be tolerable in limited cir-
cumstances, extending combat operations to the territory of States far re-
moved from a traditional battlespace is condemned as the ultimate mani-
festation of an overbroad conception of armed conflict. This criticism cuts 
to the core of the TAC concept. Expansive geographic scope was the very 
genesis of TAC, an invocation of LOAC principles to address a transna-
tional non–State belligerent threat.42 What these criticisms seem to over-
look is a critical strategic foundation for TAC itself: the relationship be-
tween the scope of counterterror military operations and the evolution of 
the TAC concept reveals that like other evolutions of armed conflict typol-
ogies, threat dynamics and strategic realities drove the law applicability as-
sessment, and not vice versa. 
The U.S. response to the September 11 terrorist attacks indicated the 
intent to leverage military power to maximum effect whenever and wher-
ever the opportunity arose.43 Employing combat power in a manner indica-
tive of armed conflict—by targeting terrorist operatives as a measure of 
first resort—would not be the exclusive modality to achieve this objective. 
However, unlike previous counterterror efforts it did become a significant, 
and in many cases primary, modality. Of course, selecting between military 
force and other capabilities involved a complex assessment of a variety of 
considerations, including the feasibility of alternate means to disable the 
threat—a classic illustration of national security policy making. What was 
clear, however, was that the nature of the threat drove a major shift in the 
response modality. 
While the TAC typology seemed to defy accepted international law cat-
egorizations of armed conflict, it was never really remarkable. National se-
curity strategy is always threat driven: intelligence defines the risk created 
by various threats; and strategy is developed to prioritize national effort to 
protect the nation from these threats, including defining the tools of na-
tional power that will be leveraged to achieve this objective. When national 
                                                                                                                      
41. O’Connell, supra note 33; Daskal, supra note 17, at 32–33. 
42. See Corn & Jensen, supra note 16. 
43. Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster & William Abresch, The Competence of the UN 
Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Execu-
tions in the ‘War on Terror’, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (2008). 
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security policy makers determine that military power must be used as one 
of these tools, this is translated into a military mission. That mission is then 
refined in the form of military strategy, which seeks to identify threat vul-
nerabilities and match combat capabilities to address them.44 Once again, 
the nature of the threat becomes the dominant driving force in this strate-
gic analysis. Thus, when the threat capability and/or vulnerability is identi-
fied outside a “hot zone,” it in no way nullifies the imperative of addressing 
the threat. In short, as others have noted, once the armed conflict door is 
open, threat–based strategy—focusing military action in response to threat 
dynamics in order to destroy or disable threat capabilities—is essentially 
opportunity driven: the conflict follows the belligerent target.45 
In conventional inter–State armed conflict, this process is almost axio-
matic. One need only consider events such as the sinking of the Bismarck in 
the South Atlantic during the opening phase of World War II46 or the 
“small war” in East Africa between Great Britain and Germany during 
World War I.47 These episodes, like countless others throughout history, 
indicate that the scope of armed conflict is threat driven. But the more un-
conventional the threat becomes, the less comfortable this concept feels. 
When non–international armed conflicts were almost exclusively internal in 
nature, this produced very little concern. It is a mistake, however, to as-
sume this was the result of some inherent international legal invalidity of 
extending such conflicts beyond the territory of one State or perhaps the 
border regions of geographically contiguous States. Instead, like all armed 
conflicts, it was the combined impact of threat dynamics and diplomatic 
and policy considerations that drove the natural geographic constraint as-
sociated with internal armed conflicts. Indeed, examples of cross–border 
spillover operations bolster this conclusion. From Vietnam, to Turkey, to 
South Africa, to Angola, to Rwanda, to Afghanistan, when States perceived 
the strategic necessity of expanding an internal armed conflict into the ter-
                                                                                                                      
44. Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats (Mar. 23, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_01.pdf (“Development of the area air 
defense plan and planning the defensive counter air operations involves integrating friend-
ly force capabilities and limitations against adversary vulnerabilities to achieve optimum 
results in a dynamic tactical environment.”). 
45. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May 11, 
2009), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2009/06/06/targeted-killing-in-us-counterterror 
ism-strategy-and-law/. 
46. See Ward Carr, Surviving the Bismarck’s Sinking, 20 NAVAL HISTORY 54 (2006). 
47. See EDWARD PAICE, WORLD WAR I: THE AFRICAN FRONT: AN IMPERIAL WAR 
ON THE DARK CONTINENT 1–3 (2008). 
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ritory of a neighboring State based on the threat dynamics, they have al-
ways done so.48 
History demonstrates that the scope of armed conflict—whether inter-
national or non–international—is threat driven. Strategic reality indicates 
that States engaged in armed conflict will, and in fact often must, “take the 
fight to the enemy.” But this does not mean that other considerations, 
principally diplomatic and political, are not also relevant to the actual scope 
of military operations associated with an armed conflict. Like so many oth-
er aspects of international law, authority rarely imposes obligation, and 
States take into account a variety of diplomatic, military and policy consid-
erations when choosing when and where to assert combat power against an 
enemy. One element in this equation is always the tactical, operational and 
strategic value of attacking a particular lawful target. This value assessment 
must be balanced against second and third–order negative consequences of 
exercising attack authority. In the “hot zone” context, this analysis is cen-
tral to the tactical and operational targeting process, where commanders 
routinely refrain from attacking a lawful target because they conclude doing 
so will not be worth the costs attendant in attack.49 At the strategic level, 
when the target is identified outside the “hot zone,” diplomatic conse-
quences of asserting military power in the territory of another State must 
be included among these “costs.” Because such costs are so significant, 
States often refrain from exercising this authority. 
In the international armed conflict context, the law of neutrality pro-
vides an effective framework for assessing when such military action is law-
ful.50 Neutrality law also provides belligerent States with the legal leverage 
to demand neutral States refrain from conduct that would trigger the need 
for such military action.51 Unfortunately, the principles established by the 
law of neutrality are inapposite to TAC. Indeed, TAC is in many ways sui 
generis, as it involves a military response to highly dispersed enemy capabili-
ties and fleeting windows of opportunity to target those capabilities. Thus, 
the value of attacking such targets in TAC has obviously been perceived as 
                                                                                                                      
48. Vité, supra note 4. 
49. International Security Assistance Force–Kabul, Afghanistan, Tactical Directive 
(July 6, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive 
_090706.pdf; Marybeth P. Ulrich, The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-
Military Relations, 41 PARAMETERS: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 86, 93 (2011) (discussing 
General McChrystal’s decision to limit attack authority). 
50. The Law of Armed Conflict Neutrality, supra note 21. 
51. Id. 
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far more significant than attacking enemy targets outside “hot zones” of 
conflict in the context of more conventional inter–State or intra–State 
armed conflicts.  
Consequently, the geographic scope of operations associated with TAC 
presents unique challenges (if not dilemmas). Unlike the accepted typology 
of international conflicts—inter–State armed hostilities—the geographic 
scope of TAC is not framed by the complementary international legal prin-
ciples of neutrality. However, unlike the accepted non–international con-
flict typology—internal armed hostilities—the enemy center of gravity 
and/or attacks that will produce decisive effect will often be located in are-
as far removed from “hot zones”. Understanding this dynamic is critical to 
assessing the validity or wisdom of imposing a geographic “box” on per-
missible TAC scope. Operational range is not an arbitrary element of 
LOAC regulation. It is, instead, a logical consequence of the nature of the 
conflicts themselves: in the more conventional context—be it international 
or non–international armed conflict—the enemy center of gravity is rarely 
dispersed beyond the hot zone of conflict. In contrast, the enemy in TAC 
deliberately avoids consolidating its center of gravity in such zones, but in-
stead operates out of whatever safe haven offers the best opportunity for 
protection from the reach of State military capabilities.52  
This does not mean that the uncertainties created by the intersection of 
threat–based scope and TAC are insignificant. To the contrary, extending 
the concept of armed conflict to a transnational non–State opponent has 
resulted in significant discomfort related to the assertion of State military 
power. But attempting to decouple the permissible geography of armed 
conflict from threat–driven strategy by imposing some arbitrary legal limit 
on the geographic scope of TAC is an unrealistic and ultimately futile en-
deavor. Other solutions to these uncertainties must be pursued—solutions 
that mitigate the perceived overbreadth of authority associated with TAC. 
As explained below, these solutions should focus on four considerations:  
 
(1)  managing application of the inherent right of self–defense when it re-
sults in action within the sovereign territory of a non–consenting State;  
(2)  adjusting the traditional targeting methodology to account for the in-
creased uncertainties associated with TAC threat identification;  
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(3)  considering the feasibility of a “functional hors de combat” test to account 
for incapacitating enemy belligerents incapable of offering hostile re-
sistance; and  
(4)  continuing to enhance the process for ensuring that preventive deten-
tion of captured belligerent operatives does not become unjustifiably 
protracted in duration. 
 
This essay does not seek to develop each of these mitigation measures 
in depth. Instead, it proposes that focusing on these (and perhaps other 
innovations in existing legal norms) is a more rational approach to mitigat-
ing the impact of TAC than imposing an arbitrary geographic scope limita-
tion. Other scholars have already begun to examine some of these con-
cepts, a process that will undoubtedly continue in the future. Whether 
these innovations take the form of law or policy is another complex ques-
tion, which should be the focus of exploration and debate. In short, reject-
ing the search for geographic limits on the scope of TAC should not be 
equated with ignorance of the risks attendant with this broad conception of 
armed conflict. Instead, it must be based on the premise that even if such a 
limit were proposed, it would ultimately prove ineffective in preventing the 
conduct of operations against transnational non–State threats where the 
State concludes such operations will produce a decisive effect. Instead, fo-
cusing on the underlying issues themselves and considering how the law 
might be adjusted to account for actual or perceived authority overbreadth 
is a more pragmatic response to these concerns. 
 
A. Jus ad Bellum and the Authority to Take the Fight to the Enemy 
  
One example of proposals to mitigate the risk of overbreadth associated 
with TAC is the “unable or unwilling” test highlighted by the scholarship 
of Professor Ashley Deeks.53 Deeks proposes a methodology for balancing 
a State’s inherent right to defend itself against transnational non–State 
threats and the sovereignty of other States where threat operatives are lo-
cated. Because the law of neutrality cannot provide the framework for bal-
ancing these interests (as it does in the context of international armed con-
flicts), Deeks acknowledges that some other framework is necessary to lim-
it resort to military force outside “hot zones,” even when justified as a 
measure of national self–defense. The test she proposes seeks to limit self–
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help uses of military force to situations of absolute necessity by imposing a 
set of conditions that must be satisfied to provide some objective assurance 
that the intrusion into another State’s territory is a genuine measure of last 
resort.54 This is pure lex lata,55 so is Deeks, to an extent. However, Deeks, 
having served in the Department of State Legal Advisor’s Office, recogniz-
es that if TAC is a reality (which it is for the United States), these innova-
tions are necessary to ensure it does not result in unjustifiably overbroad 
U.S. military action.  
 
B. Target Identification and Engagement 
 
This is precisely the approach that should be considered in the jus in bello 
branch of conflict regulation to achieve an analogous balance between ne-
cessity and risk during the execution of combat operations. Even assuming 
the “unable or unwilling” test effectively limits the exercise of national 
self–defense in response to transnational terrorism, it in no way mitigates 
the risks associated with the application of combat power once an opera-
tion is authorized.  
The in bello targeting framework is an obvious starting point for this 
type of exploration of the concept and its potential adjustment.56 Indeed, it 
seems increasingly apparent that while TAC suggests a broad scope of au-
thority to employ combat power in a LOAC framework with no geograph-
ic constraint, the consternation generated by this effect is a result of the 
uncertainty produced by the complexity of threat recognition. This con-
sternation is most acute in relation to three aspects of action to incapacitate 
terrorist belligerent operatives: the relationship between threat recognition 
and the authority to kill as a measure of first resort (the difficulty of apply-
ing the principle of distinction when confronting irregular enemy belliger-
ent forces); the pragmatic illogic of asserting the right to kill as a measure 
of first resort to an individual subject to capture with virtually no risk to 
U.S. forces; and the ability to apply this targeting authority against uncon-
ventional enemy operatives located outside of “hot zones”.57 
                                                                                                                      
54. See id. at 507–8. 
55. J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on Customary In-
ternational Humanitarian Law, 198 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 116, 121–25 (2008). 
56. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (4th ed. 2004); Corn & Jensen, supra note 16. 
57. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
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These concerns flow from the intersection of a battlespace that is func-
tionally unrestricted by geography and the unconventional nature of the 
terrorist belligerent operative. The combined effect of these factors is a 
target identification paradigm that defies traditional threat recognition 
methodologies: no uniform, no established doctrine, no consistent locus of 
operations and dispersed capabilities.58 It is certainly true that threat identi-
fication challenges are in no way unique to TAC; threat identification has 
always been difficult, especially in the context of “traditional” non–
international armed conflicts involving unconventional belligerent oppo-
nents. Yet, when this threat recognition uncertainty was confined to the 
geography of one State, it was never perceived to be as problematic as it is 
in the context of TAC. This is perplexing. In both contexts, the unconven-
tional nature of the enemy increases the risk of mistake in the target selec-
tion and engagement process.59 Thus, employing the same approach is 
completely logical. 
Two factors appear to provide an explanation for the increased con-
cern over the threat identification uncertainty in the context of TAC. One 
of these is beyond the scope of “mitigation solutions,” while the other is 
not. The first is the increased public awareness and interest in both the le-
gal authority to use military force and the legality of the conduct of hostili-
ties, a factor that inevitably increases the scrutiny on military power under 
the rubric of TAC. This pervasive and intense interest in and legal critique 
of military operations associated with what is euphemistically called the war 
on terror is truly unprecedented. In this “lawfare” environment, it is unsur-
prising that government action that deprives individuals of life as a measure 
of first resort or subjects them to preventive detention that may last a life-
time—often impacting individuals located far beyond a “hot zone” of 
armed hostilities—generates intense legal scrutiny.60 This factor, whether a 
                                                                                                                      
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469); Daskal, supra note 17; Pakistan Unrelenting in 
Demanding Drone Strike End, CBS NEWS (July 30, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
501363_162-57482623/pakistan-unrelenting-in-demanding-drone-strike-end/. 
58. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the 
LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 337 (2012) 
[hereinafter Corn & Corn]; Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed 
Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 437 (2012). 
59. Corn, supra note 7. 
60. The ACLU drone litigation is the first lawsuit in modern history challenging legal 
authority for wartime targeting. See ACLU v. DOJ, No. 10-436, 2011 WL 4005324 
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net positive or negative, is a reality that is unlikely to abate in the foreseea-
ble future. 
The second factor—a factor that is amenable to adjustments in legal 
authorities to ameliorate the perceived overbreadth of TAC—is the percep-
tion that this risk of targeting error when attacking unconventional forces 
increases proportionally with the attenuation from a “hot zone” of opera-
tions.61 Whether there is any empirical foundation for this perception is 
uncertain, nor is it clear that the assumption itself is valid. However, in 
many ways perception has become reality.  
In an article published in the Brooklyn Law Review, I proposed a sliding 
quantum of information related to the assessment of targeting legality 
based on relative proximity to a “hot zone.”62 In essence, I proposed that 
when conducting operations against unconventional non–State operatives, 
the reasonableness of a target legality judgment requires increased informa-
tional certainty the more attenuated the nominated target becomes to a 
zone of traditional combat operations. The concept was proposed as a 
measure to mitigate the increased risk of targeting error when engaging an 
unconventional belligerent operative in an area that itself does not indicate 
belligerent activity. Jennifer Daskal offers a similar proposal in her article, 
The Geography of the Battlefield.63 Daskal presents a more comprehensive ap-
proach to adjusting the traditional targeting framework when applied to the 
TAC context. Both of these articles seek to mitigate the consequence of 
applying broad LOAC authority against a dispersed and unconventional 
enemy; both methods that should continue to be explored. 
 
C. The Capture or Kill Dilemma? 
 
One of the issues Daskal addresses in her article beyond that of target iden-
tification is the legitimacy of applying the authority to kill as a measure of 
first resort to enemy belligerents outside “hot zones” of hostilities.64 This 
issue is obviously a focal point of the contemporary debate over the use of 
unmanned aerial systems (armed drones) to attack belligerent operatives. It 
                                                                                                                      
61. This is the foundation for Daskal’s hot zone article. See Daskal, supra note 17. 
62. Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information Component, supra 
note 58, at 460–94 (“The greater the presumption that a potential object of attack is not a 
legal military objective, the greater the quantum of information necessary to justify attack-
ing the target.”). 
63. See Daskal, supra note 17. 
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is also at the center of the debate related to the authority to engage civilians 
taking a direct part in hostilities.65 What Daskal proposes, which is analo-
gous to the ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance,66 is that capture (rather than 
kill) should be obligatory when it is a feasible alternative to employing 
deadly force.67 
No single aspect of the DPH Interpretive Guidance generated more con-
troversy than Section IX of the study, which asserted an identical obliga-
tion to capture instead of kill civilians engaged in DPH whenever feasible.68 
In support of this assertion, the study relies on an article published by Jean 
Pictet (the well–known author of the ICRC commentaries to the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions) in which he asserts that the principle of humanity obli-
gates belligerents to refrain from using deadly force against enemy belliger-
ents when capture is a “risk free” alternative.69 Many LOAC experts, in-
cluding this author, contest this interpretation of the law, arguing instead 
                                                                                                                      
65. NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (May 2009) (prepared by Nils Melzer) [hereinafter ICRC 
DPH Interpretive Guidance], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-
002-0990.pdf (“[T]he kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not 
entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”); see W. Hays 
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, 
and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 769 (2010) (responding to the new guidance). 
66. ICRC DPH Interpretative Guidance, supra note 65. 
67. See Daskal, supra note 17. 
68. See ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65. 
69. As found in Parks, supra note 65, at 785–87. According to footnote 221 of the In-
terpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitar-
ian Law,  
 
It is in this sense that Pictet’s famous statement should be understood that “[i]f we can 
put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain 
the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve 
the same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil”. See 
Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht, 
Nijhoff 1985), pp. 75 f. During the expert meetings, it was generally recognized that the 
approach proposed by Pictet is unlikely to be operable in classic battlefield situations in-
volving large-scale confrontations (Report DPH 2006, pp. 75 f., 78) and that armed forces  
operating in situations of armed conflict, even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry 
and means of observation, may not always have the means or the opportunity to capture 
rather than kill (Report DPH 2006, p. 63).  
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that unless and until the enemy belligerent becomes hors de combat, the law 
permits the application of deadly force as a measure of first resort.70 
There is, however, a common thread that runs through the ICRC DPH 
Interpretive Guidance, precursors to the Interpretive Guidance (most significantly 
the Israeli High Court of Justice decision on targeted killings),71 Daskal’s 
proposal, and Pictet’s interpretation of the principle of humanity: the obvi-
ous discomfort with a legal norm that permits the killing of a human being 
when capture provides a risk–free alternative for achieving the goal of in-
capacitation. In my article Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades,72 I attempt to 
explain why this apparent overbreadth of deadly force authority is an un-
fortunate yet necessary aspect of armed hostilities, and I remain unper-
suaded that the law imposes an implicit limitation of the authority to use 
deadly force based on the unconventional nature of the belligerent oppo-
nent or the opponent’s geographic location.  
While a capture–instead–of–kill obligation remains a controversial as-
sertion, what is undisputed is that LOAC prohibits deliberate attacks on 
any person not actively participating in hostilities, whether a civilian who 
has directly participated in hostilities or a belligerent who is hors de combat. 
Traditionally, an enemy belligerent is rendered hors de combat only as the re-
sult of wounds, sickness or surrender. The normal application of this 
LOAC principle permits attack on enemy belligerent operatives—members 
of organized belligerent groups engaged in hostilities—regardless of their 
location, or the ease with which they might be captured, so long as they are 
still “combat effective,” even when they pose no immediate or apparent 
threat.73 This seemingly harsh outcome is justified by a number of consid-
erations. It is ultimately based on the presumption that a fully functional 
member of an enemy belligerent group represents an ongoing threat, and 
attacking that individual is linked to bringing about the submission of the 
group writ large.74 
This explains why many LOAC experts reject the suggestion that an 
enemy belligerent operative is somehow immune from attack as the result 
                                                                                                                      
70. ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65; Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples 
and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limits of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES 52 (2010). 
71. See Parks, supra note 65, at 788–93. 
72. See Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70. 
73. See Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 115 (2010) (noting how the harshness of this rule has led some to question its continu-
ing validity) [hereinafter Blum]. 
74. See Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70; Parks, supra note 65. 
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of being in a location where he can be safely captured. However, the com-
bined effect of being in such a location—especially a location distant from 
any ongoing active combat operations—with the conclusion that the oper-
ative is unarmed and functionally inoffensive (for example, an unarmed al 
Qaeda operative exiting a commercial airliner at a U.S. airport while under 
close observation by government agents) explains why this assertion of kill 
authority is criticized as unjustifiably over–broad. 
The debate is symbolic of the overall challenge to the current response 
to transnational terrorism through the armed conflict modality: it reveals an 
effort to push a square peg into a round hole. It is clear that the “kill au-
thority” analytical methodology is derived from a predominantly conven-
tional conflict context. In that context, the balance of interests justifies the 
at times over–broad application of deadly combat power, and altering this 
equation produces an unjustified shift of risk to attacking forces (a point I 
attempted to explain in Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades).75 Perhaps, how-
ever, the context of geographically dispersed combat operations within the 
framework of TAC warrants consideration of imposing a policy–based 
constraint on this authority, what might be characterized as a functional 
hors de combat test. Such a test would limit “kill authority” when tactical as-
sessment indicates that capture is completely feasible without subjecting 
friendly forces to risk, and the object of capture is attenuated from both an 
area of active combat operations and other belligerent operatives. 
Ironically, when Professor Gabrielle Blum proposed such a limitation 
in her article The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers,76 I was quite skeptical. Howev-
er, my skepticism focused primarily on two considerations. First, her pro-
posal extended to “hot zones”. I remain opposed to such an extension, as I 
believe it would inject a dangerous dilution of tactical initiative into the ex-
ecution of combat operations.77 Second, it was unclear whether Professor 
Blum was proposing a legal norm, or a policy constraint on permissible 
legal authority. Once it was clear that we shared opposition to modifying 
the existing legal authority to attack even an inoffensive enemy belligerent 
operative (such as an enemy soldier sleeping in a barracks or assembly area 
or attempting to retreat from an ongoing attack), and that she was in fact 
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proposing consideration of policy limits on that authority, we were much 
more closely aligned in our views.78  
This latter aspect of the “capture or kill” debate is critical, and in my 
opinion, if such a limitation on targeting authority is justified, it must be 
framed as a policy limit on otherwise lawful authority: a rule of engage-
ment.79 This is because there may be situations, even where these condi-
tions are satisfied, when an attack is justified because of the influence it will 
produce on enemy leadership and other belligerent operatives. It is this 
corporate, as opposed to individualized, approach to attack justification 
that distinguishes targeting belligerent operatives from targeting civilians 
taking a direct part in hostilities. It therefore requires strictly limiting any 
“capture or kill” obligation to a policy applique restricting underlying legal 
authority. In short, even when capture is a completely feasible option to 
incapacitate an enemy belligerent operative, there still are times when attack 
is preferred because of the shock effect it will produce on the corporate 
enemy capability.80 
Such a policy may also be a useful method to alleviate the uncertainties 
associated with the intersection of belligerent detention authority and bel-
ligerent targeting authority. The complexity of this connection seems to 
have been highlighted by Justice Kennedy early in our TAC with al Qaeda, 
when he challenged the government to articulate a unified theory of deten-
tion/attack authority in the Padilla oral arguments.81 In response to the 
government’s assertion that Padilla’s status as an enemy belligerent justified 
his LOAC–based preventive detention, Justice Kennedy asked a question 
that the government never answered: would that same status justify killing 
Padilla as he walked off the plane at Chicago O’Hare Airport? 
 
QUESTION: Would you shoot him when he got off the plane? 
 
MR. CLEMENT: No, I don't think we could for good and sufficient rea-
sons – 
                                                                                                                      
78. Gabriella Blum, Address Before the American Society of International Law, Mind 
the Gap: International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict (Jan. 25, 2010), 
audio recording available at http://www.asil.org/files/100125mindthegap.mp3. 
79. See Corn & Corn, supra note 58, at 353–57. 
80. Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70, at 80 (“attacking the enemy with 
deadly combat power is customarily considered necessary to force an opponent into sub-
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81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 
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QUESTION: I assume that you could shoot someone that you had cap-
tured on the field of battle.82 
 
The Solicitor General offered a false analogy in response to this question, 
asserting that once an individual is captured the authority to kill dissipates. 
This is simply an application of the hors de combat rule, and is unremarkable. 
However, what the question really exposed was whether the authority to 
kill—an authority triggered by enemy belligerent status—applied prior to 
capture where capture was a completely feasible course of action. That 
question remains relevant, and by subjecting kill authority to a policy–based 
constraint it will perhaps strike a more effective balance between necessity 
and humanity and contribute to a logical synchronization between the ex-
ercise of detention and targeting authority for individuals captured in situa-
tions similar to those of Padilla. (Interestingly, the Solicitor General ulti-
mately relied on rules of engagement to complete his response to the ques-
tion: “And I think in every case, there are rules of engagement, there are 
rules for the appropriate force that should be used. And I don't know that 
there are any.”)83 
This “functional hors de combat” concept and accordant policy limitation 
on the use of deadly force as a first resort is something I have only begun 
to consider. However, it seems clear that addressing the perceived over-
breadth of “kill authority” within the context of TAC is an important en-
deavor that may effectively respond to arguments claiming that the TAC 
concept is illegitimate. Developing a rational methodology to assess when 
the kill option is justified, or when capture should be attempted as a condi-
tion precedent—even if only in the form of policy—would be a potentially 
valuable advancement in the complex equation of unconventional enemy 
belligerent targeting. 
 
D. Long–Term Preventive Detention 
 
Capture, of course, produces its own complex issues of perceived 
ovebreadth, all flowing from subjecting captives to LOAC–based preven-
tive detention. Debates over the legitimacy of designating terrorist opera-
tives as enemy belligerents and subjecting them to LOAC detention princi-
ples has raged since the first detainees were transferred to Guantanamo 
                                                                                                                      
82. Id.  
83. Id. 
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Bay, Cuba, in 2001.84 While far from a consensus view, for the purposes of 
U.S. practice, this legitimacy issue has been resolved in favor of the au-
thority to detain individuals based on a determination of status as an enemy 
belligerent (although how that determination is made, both substantively 
and procedurally, is an area of U.S. practice that continues to evolve).85 De-
tention review procedures have been another source of controversy, and 
have developed substantially since the inception of the belligerent deten-
tions.86 As long as debates continue in full force over the credibility of the 
procedures adopted for assessing or revalidating enemy belligerent classifi-
cations and the judicial review of these decisions, it is unlikely these current 
procedures will undergo further substantial modification. Instead, it seems 
relatively clear that the government has reached the point where it believes 
these procedures are both operationally effective and legally defensible—an 
inference bolstered by the overall record of government success in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Two issues, however, should be subjected 
to more intense development: who should represent detainees in the status 
determination process, and how to determine when preventive detention 
should terminate. 
From the inception of the unprivileged detention operation, the United 
States has chosen not to provide suspected enemy belligerents with assis-
tance of legal counsel.87 Instead, the review process implemented to assess 
this status—both at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan—has relied on lay 
military officers to assist detainees through the proceedings.88 This practice 
is apparently the result of analogy to the process established in Article 5 of 
                                                                                                                      
84. Chris Jenks & Eric T. Jensen, Indefinite Detention Under the Laws of War, 22 STAN-
FORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 41, 51–55 (2011) (“[T]he deconstructionist approach 
removes a large portion of internationally recognized and accepted provisions for regulat-
ing detention associated with armed conflict—the Geneva Conventions—while leaving 
the underlying question of how to govern detention unanswered.”)  
85. Id. 
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277 (Mar. 7, 
2011); Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legit-
imacy, THE ARMY LAWYER (DA PAM 27-50-445) (June 2010). 
87. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUMBIA LAW 
REVIEW 1013, 1037–38 (“[T]he legality of... military detention and interrogation without 
access to counsel remains unresolved.”). 
88. See memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Def., Order Estab-
lishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defens 
elink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
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the Third Geneva Convention for resolving doubt as to whether captives 
qualify for prisoner of war status.89 
In a recently published article, Unprivileged Belligerents,90 I challenge the 
underlying rationale for this lay assistance model. Specifically, I argue that 
the stakes involved in these review proceedings and the inherent complexi-
ty of granting status to non–State belligerent actors—a difficulty caused by 
the need to rely on pre–capture conduct and affiliation as opposed to the 
much easier reliance on uniform or other formal belligerent identification 
indicators—justifies assistance of legal officers. While I acknowledge that 
lay officers are certainly capable of learning the procedures applicable to 
these review proceedings, I question whether non–lawyers can effectively 
represent the interests of suspected enemy operatives. In contrast, I assert 
that the ethos of zealous representation—a core ethical norm of the legal 
profession—will enhance the quality and legitimacy of the detainee–status–
determination process. 
This lay–representation paradigm has finally been called into question. 
The extremely controversial provisions of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2012, authorizing preventive military detention of 
U.S. and alien terrorist operatives, include, for the first time, a mandate to 
provide detainees with legal representation during detention review pro-
ceedings.91 The statute, signed into law by President Obama on December 
19, 2011, provides that the Secretary of Defense must submit to Congress 
within ninety days of enactment a report “setting forth the procedures for 
determining the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities au-
thorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–
40) for purposes of section 1021.”92 The law then provides, inter alia, that 
                                                                                                                      
89. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 1355, art. 5 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
90. Geoffrey S. Corn & Peter A. Chickris, Unprivileged Belligerents, Preventive Detention, 
and Fundamental Fairness: Rethinking the Review Tribunal Representation Model, SANTA CLARA 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (2012). 
91. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law No. 112-81 
§ 1024(a), 125 Stat. 1298, 1565 (2011). 
92. Section 1021 “affirms that the authority of the President to use all necessary and 
appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force . . . includes the 
authority. . . to detain covered persons. . . pending disposition under the law of war.” Id. § 
1021(a). Persons who may be detained under section 1021 include persons “who planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided . . . or harbored those responsible” for the attacks occur-
ring on September 11, 2001 as well as persons who were  
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“an unprivileged enemy belligerent may, at the election of the belligerent, 
be represented by military counsel at proceedings for the determination of 
status of the belligerent.”93 
It is not yet clear at what point in the detention process this assistance 
of counsel requirement will become operative. According to the Confer-
ence Report on the NDAA:  
 
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1036) that would re-
quire the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for determining 
the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), includ-
ing access to a military judge and a military lawyer for an enemy belliger-
ent who will be held in long–term detention. The House bill contained no 
similar provision.  
 
The House recedes with an amendment clarifying that the Secretary of 
Defense is not required to apply the procedures for long–term detention 
in the case of a person for whom habeas corpus review is available in fed-
eral court. Because this provision is prospective, the Secretary of Defense 
is authorized to determine the extent, if any, to which such procedures 
will be applied to detainees for whom status determinations have already 
been made prior to the date of the enactment of this Act. The conferees 
expect that the procedures issued by the Secretary of Defense will define 
what constitutes ‘‘long–term’’ detention for the purposes of subsection 
(b). The conferees understand that under current Department of Defense 
practice in Afghanistan, a detainee goes before a Detention Review Board 
for a status determination 60 days after capture, and again 6 months after 
that. The Department of Defense has considered extending the period of 
time before a second review is required. The conferees expect that the 
procedures required by subsection (b) would not be triggered by the first 
review, but could be triggered by the second review, in the discretion of 
the Secretary.94  
 
Thus, legal representation will now turn on the definition of “long–term” 
detention. Nonetheless, this is an important step forward in the procedural 
                                                                                                                      
a part of or substantially supported al–Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any per-
son who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of 
such enemy forces.  
 
Id. § 1021(b). 
93. Id. § 1024(b)(2). 
94. H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, pt. 1, at 696–97 (2011). 
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protections afforded individuals subjected to wartime preventive detention. 
Whatever emerges as the ultimate triggering point, the detention review 
process will undoubtedly be enhanced by this provision. While no amount 
of process will ameliorate the concerns of critics of the fundamental con-
cept of applying wartime preventive detention to counterterror operations, 
even the most ardent of such critics must acknowledge that providing rep-
resentatives trained in the lawyer ethos of zealous representation is a 
marked improvement to the lay representation model utilized prior to the 
enactment of the NDAA 2012. 
Preventive detention based on a determination of belligerent status, like 
targeting based on the same categorization, is central to the entire TAC 
concept. The ability to use combat power to kill as a measure of first resort 
compared to detention that prevents a return to belligerent activities are the 
two most significant authorities triggered by the armed conflict characteri-
zation. It is therefore unlikely that the United States will abandon this de-
tention regime, which, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Boumediene v. 
Bush, may continue for an entire generation.95 When the stakes of a factual 
determination by a review tribunal—even one not related to punitive sanc-
tion—are so obviously profound, it is fair to ask whether reliance on lay 
military officers to represent the interests of alleged belligerent operatives 
can genuinely be considered legitimate. If legitimacy is defined by a credible 
and fair balance between the interests of protecting national security and 
the interests inherent in safeguards from arbitrary detention, it seems diffi-
cult to ignore the potential value legal assistance might add to the accuracy 
of the belligerent status determination. 
Once that decision is made, with or without assistance of counsel, the 
impact is clear: preventive detention for the duration of hostilities. But this 
raises an even more complex and in many ways troubling incongruity be-
tween the nature of the ongoing TAC against al Qaeda and the LOAC 
principles upon which this detention model is based: when should deten-
tion terminate? This question is critically important to the credibility and 
legitimacy of asserting LOAC authority to justify detention. The entire un-
privileged belligerent detention regime is built on the premise that deten-
tion is justified for the duration of hostilities to prevent the belligerent 
                                                                                                                      
95. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (extending the constitutional 
writ of habeas corpus to unprivileged enemy belligerents detained at Guantanamo Naval 
Base based on the conclusion, inter alia, that “the consequence of error may be detention 
of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk too 
significant to ignore.”). 
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from returning to operations.96 This principle derives from LOAC and, in 
the context of more conventional armed conflicts, is virtually axiomatic.97 
However, it seems equally clear that the principle of incapacitation by de-
tention for the duration of hostilities was not developed in contemplation 
of an armed conflict of unlimited duration. This aspect of the current de-
tention regime is exacerbated by the nature of the armed conflict, in which 
some type of formal or explicit recognition of hostility termination by the 
belligerent parties is virtually inconceivable (this is certainly not the case in 
the context of inter–State hostilities, or even intra–State hostilities involv-
ing organized armed groups).98 
It is therefore unsurprising that one of the most consistent criticisms of 
U.S. detention policy has been that it authorizes indefinite detention.99 This 
is virtually inconceivable in any other context, regardless of whether the 
individual is detained within a punitive or preventive framework. One solu-
tion to this issue, of course, is to abandon LOAC–based preventive deten-
tion entirely. This, however, is unlikely in the foreseeable future, which 
leads some scholars to critique the potential overbreadth of purely status–
based preventive detention—even within a LOAC framework. For exam-
ple, in their article, Indefinite Detention Under the Laws of War,100 Professors 
(and retired military lawyers) Jenks and Jensen assert that what might be 
best understood as “conduct–based detention validation” procedures ex-
trapolated from LOAC civilian internment rules would effectively address 
the risk of unjustified indefinite detention of unprivileged enemy belliger-
ents.101 
An alternate modification is the imposition of presumptive detention 
termination dates linked to adjusted burdens that justify continued deten-
                                                                                                                      
96. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“We conclude that detention of in-
dividuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the par-
ticular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
war as to be an exercise of the necessary and appropriate force Congress has authorized 
the President to use.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
97. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 89. 
98. List of Recent Peace Agreements, U.S. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, http://www.usip 
.org/publicationstools/latest?filter1=**ALL**&filter0=**ALL**&filter2=2223&filter3=*
*ALL**&filter4=%20(last%20visited%20Aug.%2014,%202012). 
99. See Laurie R. Blank, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too 
Far, 63 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1169, 1183–91 (2011) (noting the “inherently punitive” 
nature of holding suspected terrorists indefinitely under the guise of prisoners of war). 
100. See Jenks & Jensen, supra note 84. 
101. Id. at 87–91 (addressing the various ways detention is authorized to end accord-
ing to LOAC principles). 
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tion. Drawing an analogy to procedures for declassification of national se-
curity information, this approach would begin by assessing the extreme end 
state for prisoners of war detentions since 1949. Such an assessment sug-
gests that almost all such detentions terminated within ten years from in-
ception.102 Thus, for example, a policy might be adopted that would create 
a presumptive detention termination date ten years from the date of incep-
tion. Like the declassification context, this presumption would not be con-
clusive. Instead, it would impose on the government a rebuttable burden to 
justify continuing preventive detention beyond—or even until—
presumptive termination. Subsequent duration triggers could be adopted 
that would increase the burden of proof on the government, leading ulti-
mately to a requirement that the government must justify what would be in 
effect “generational” detention by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the detainee is likely to return to belligerent activities. 
Perhaps neither of these approaches is ideal, but both share the com-
mon goal of aligning long–term preventive detention—what is in effect 
indefinite detention—with a legitimate determination of necessity. Like the 
other adjustments suggested by this essay, accomplishing this goal will mit-
igate the actual and perceived overbreadth of asserting LOAC authority 
within a TAC framework.  
Perhaps other modifications to existing LOAC authorities should also 
be explored to achieve this objective. Devoting academic and policy efforts 
toward these and other similar authority adjustments will produce a more 
positive effect than fishing for the Red Herring of a defined geography of 
armed conflict. This is precisely because they will be rooted in both opera-
tional logic and humanitarian considerations, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of being accepted as consistent with strategic imperatives—not as an 
arbitrary legal fiction inconsistent with a threat–driven strategic reality. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The law of conflict regulation is arguably at a critical crossroads. If threat 
drives strategy, and strategy drives the existence of armed conflict, the con-
cept of TAC seems an unavoidable reality in the modern strategic envi-
                                                                                                                      
102. See Piero Scaruffi, Wars and Genocides of the 20th Century, Scaruffi.com, 
http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012); see also SU-
SANNE EVERETT, WARS OF THE 20TH CENTURY (1986). See generally List of Wars 1945–
1989, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_1945–1989 (last visited 
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ronment. Opponents of TAC will continue to argue for limiting armed 
conflict to the well–accepted inter–State or intra–State hostilities frame-
works, but this would only drive States to adopt sub rosa uses of the same 
type of power under the guise of legal fictions. Concepts such as self–
defense targeting, or internationalized law enforcement, might avoid the 
armed conflict characterization, but they would do little to resolve the un-
derlying uncertainties associated with TAC. Even worse, they would inject 
regulatory uncertainty into the planning and execution of military counter-
terror operations, and expose those called upon to put themselves in 
harm’s way to protect the State to legal liabilities based on inapposite legal 
norms. 
If, however, the geographic scope of TAC is accepted as a threat–
driven dynamic, then it seems imperative to consider how the law will re-
spond to the uncertainties created by this reality and addressed in this es-
say. What conduct results in the designation of belligerent status? Should 
there be an individualized, “imminence” assessment associated with target-
ing suspected belligerent operatives outside a “hot zone” of conflict? How 
certain must an operational commander be before reaching this conclu-
sion? Should capture instead of kill be a legal or policy obligation outside 
the “hot zone?” Should there be a presumptive termination date for bellig-
erent detention authority, requiring the State to justify continued detention 
by some burden sufficiently weighty to protect individuals from arbitrary 
indefinite detention?  
These are all important and legitimate questions that should be the fo-
cus of legal debate and analysis. TAC may provide a framework based on 
core LOAC principles within which to assess these questions, but TAC in 
no way conclusively resolves them. Instead, it was originally conceived as a 
typology of armed conflict that reconciled the denial of privileged belliger-
ent legitimacy for the terrorist enemy with the obligation to respect funda-
mental LOAC norms in the execution of such operations (to include the 
detention and treatment of captured terrorist belligerents), all within the 
strategic imperative of robust global counterterror operations. No other 
typology fully satisfied these goals—goals that drove the U.S. response to 
September 11. The lingering questions associated with this effort to syn-
chronize strategic objectives with legal regulation must be the focal point 
of critical analysis regarding the future of irregular warfare. 
 
 
